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LAWYERS AS "THE GREAT SOCIAL EVIL"
Gowri Ramachandran*
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores what we can learn from drawing analogies and
contrasts between some of the responses to the current "crisis in legal
education" and some of the responses to the so-called "great social
evil" of prostitution during the Victorian era. By drawing these analo-
gies and contrasts, I hope to elucidate how we may be witnessing a
reinstantiated form of the "litigation panic" that Marc Galanter iden-
tified. Like the discourse of the litigation panic, the crisis in legal edu-
cation discourse continues to often devalue lawyering and access to
law's benefits, especially for the less well off, even as it appears to
revolve around sympathy for the plight of individual lawyers and law
students "seduced" into taking on unmanageable education debt. The
discourse may not appear anti-lawyer on its face, yet it is anti-law.
Similarly, some feminist responses to prostitution during the Victorian
era were highly sympathetic to individual prostitutes, who were de-
picted as having been "seduced" into the profession by men of means,
but even as these responses may have seemed "pro-prostitute," they
were ultimately anti-prostitution. Moreover, just as the seduction nar-
rative distracted feminist reform efforts from the kind of broader so-
cial changes that would have helped individual prostitutes and other
working-class people, the seduction narrative today may distract us
from making changes that would actually help individual lawyers and
increase access to law's benefits.
What do the litigation panic and the costs of legal education have to
do with access to justice? And how could the Victorian response to
prostitution, identified at the time as "the great social evil," inform
our discourse? In his previous work, Galanter identified what he
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versity; B.A., Yale College. Thank you to Rick Abel, Tom Baker, Anne Bloom, Michael Boucai,
Michael Dorff, Bryant Garth, Danni Hart, Marc Galanter, Angela Riley, Kelly Strader, Brian
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called a "litigation panic,"1 by which he seems to have meant a de-
scriptively inaccurate belief that a "hypertrophy" of litigation was
leading to moral and economic decline.2 He also identified, in con-
junction with the panic, a vilification of lawyers as, among other
things, the agents of this moral and economic decline.3 Some might
call the term "panic" overly derogatory or exaggerated; others might
call it too kind in that it implies irrationality rather than a calculated
political strategy. By creating a panic over litigation, the rhetorical
groundwork was laid for a reduction in lawyering itself, as well as ac-
tions by parties that involve lawyers. Vilifying both lawyers and
claimants was a step towards minimizing lawyering and, ultimately,
law in the form of public accountability. If law's enforcement through
litigation were minimized, then its crucial role in the United States-
creating public accountability for one's actions-would be diminished.
Galanter once described access to justice as the "access of individu-
als to the benefits of legality."' 4 He further described the major driv-
ers of that access: (1) the legal services; (2) the rules; (3) the tribunals
in which disputes are resolved and the advocates who represent the
parties in those tribunals; and (4) the capacity of the parties. 5 The
litigation panic operated to make changes on the first and fourth driv-
ers of access to justice-the legal services themselves, and the capacity
of the parties-that would likely reduce access to justice. Would the
services exist? How much of them? What kinds of legal services
would be performed? Would there be services for business or injured
individuals? Would the parties feel proud of their legal claims for
compensation (for injuries like discrimination or product injuries), or
would they feel unworthy and dependent? Would they recognize law
as something that is available to them as one means of getting their
agendas for life accomplished? The litigation panic served as an argu-
ment for reducing both services and the parties' capacities.
Today, we have something quite different from the litigation panic
going on, namely the crisis over the cost of legal education. But the
current crisis over the cost of legal education and our response to it
has everything to do with access to justice, just as Galanter's work on
the litigation panic and lawyer jokes has much to do with access to
1. Marc Galanter, Beyond the Litigation Panic, in 37 ACAD. OF POLITICAL ScI., NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 18 (Walter Olson ed., 1988).
2. See id.
3. Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L. REV.
633, 634 (1994).
4. Marc Galanter, The Duty Not to Deliver Legal Services, 30 _J. MIAMI L. REV. 929, 932
(1976).
5. See id. at 932-36.
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justice. By comparing the current crisis over law school tuition to the
responses to prostitution of the Victorian era, I seek to highlight a
particular danger-the danger that even rhetoric about this issue that
is sympathetic to lawyers will become a reinstantiated form of the at-
tempt to eradicate, or at least severely minimize, lawyers themselves,
especially those who perform legal services for the "have-nots." Not
all participants in the current discourse surrounding the cost of legal
education are anti-access to justice. But by comparing and contrasting
the current crisis in legal education to the perception of and responses
to "the great social evil" of prostitution, we may gain insights that help
us avoid a discourse that reinstantiates the rhetoric of litigation panic,
which Galanter so usefully pointed out was tied to a concerted effort
to limit access to justice for the "have-nots."
In Part II of this Article, I will define the so-called "moral panics"
and "sex panics" identified by critical and queer theorists, to which I
compare Galanter's use of the term "litigation panic." Whether or not
"panic" is the best term, it will become clear that the phenomenon
highlighted by Galanter shares many of the common attributes of so-
called moral panics. Indeed, we will see analogies between lawyers,
who were the prime scapegoats of this litigation panic (or, one might
even say, "law panic"), and prostitutes.
A comparison between the litigation panic and the panic over pros-
titution during the Victorian era will highlight some of the very unique
features of the litigation panic. While the litigation panic was ulti-
mately a libertarian panic, the typical moral panic has been a driver to
regulation and control, including not only conservative and religious,
but also progressive and egalitarian forms of regulation. Indeed, the
Victorian sex panic was driven not only by conservative evangelicals,
but also by progressive feminists and social egalitarians who sought to
save working-class prostitutes from what they imagined were middle-
class and wealthy seducers who corrupted and abandoned them. In
contrast, the litigation panic seemed to be a driver toward deregula-
tion and decreased public accountability.
Part III of this Article highlights a surprising parallel between Vic-
torian responses to, and deeply inaccurate beliefs about, "the great
social evil," which were often sympathetic to the prostitutes them-
selves, and certain strands of the current discourse around rising law
school tuition and the inability of graduates to pay back their loans.
Most who have commented on this as a crisis are sympathetic to law-
yers, who, in their narrative, are seduced into taking on disastrous
levels of debt. But just as the Victorian reformers who pitied individ-
ual prostitutes still sought to eradicate or at least minimize the occur-
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rence of prostitution, some of the strands of the current response to
rising law school tuition still promote the reduction of lawyers and
lawyering, and thereby a reduction in access to justice. Many of these
reformers are more like those who sought to place prostitutes (at least
the saveable ones) into the penitentiary, than the pro-sex feminists
and queer activists who came decades later and sought to make life
better for prostitutes without attempting to eradicate or even shrink
the profession. Those who see rising tuition as a crisis of access tojustice are quite different from those who see a crisis of too many
lawyers.
Part IV of this Article proposes that we avoid the trap of reform
rhetoric that, however well-intentioned, may fail to provide viable al-
ternatives for upward mobility and, moreover, may contribute to a
reduction in access to justice for working-class and poor people. We
should avoid responding to rising law school costs with proposals to
reduce lawyering, especially lawyering focused on the "have-nots."
Much of the pity for recent and future law students is correctly placed,
just as it was correct to view the life of most prostitutes in the Victo-
rian era as dangerous and full of suffering. Moreover, that pity is
often motivated by a sincere concern for the well-being of those who
seek to enter the profession, as it surely was for many of the Victorian
reformers, especially feminists of the time. But the impulse to eradi-
cate or at least contain lawyers by "saving" them from seduction into
the profession reinstantiates the goals of those who spread the original
litigation panic, which were to limit access to justice and, ultimately,
public accountability through law. Instead, we need far more quality
empiricism on what motivates students to take the gamble of high
debt with mediocre chances of paying it off comfortably. We also
need innovative responses that simultaneously provide those students
with good alternatives, which might bring the "benefits of legality ' 6 to
more than just a wealthy few.
II. THE LITIGATION PANIC IN COMPARISON TO MORAL PANICS
Stanley Cohen coined the term "moral panics" in 1972 to describe a
situation in which a "condition, episode, person, or group of persons
emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and inter-
ests."' 7 After a fair amount of critique, however, other writers have
6. Galanter, supra note 4, at 932.
7. Gilbert Herdt, Introduction: Moral Panics, Sexual Rights, and Cultural Anger, in MORAL
PANICS, SEX PANICS: FEAR AND THE FIGHT OVER SEXUAL Rirrs 1, 3 (Gilbert Herdt ed., 2009)
[hereinafter MORAL PANICS, SEX PANICS] (quoting STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL
PANICS (3d ed. 2002)).
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refined the idea to make it more specific and useful, distinguishing it
from phenomena such as "moral shock," "great fear," "moral cam-
paigns," and "cultural anger."'8 A subcategory of moral panics has
also been identified: sexual panics.9 A number of historical accounts
of these sex panics have been produced, such as Gayle Rubin's fa-
mous study of American moral panics against deviant sexual practices
and groups.' 0
While "panic" may not be the most accurate term for every instance
of this phenomenon, this Article identifies common attributes in these
panics, especially sex panics, many of which are also shared by Ga-
lanter's "litigation panic." In fact, Galanter identified an entire strand
of lawyer jokes and anti-lawyer rhetoric in Lowering the Bar that com-
pares lawyers to prostitutes."
The so-called moral or sex panics typically include "processes of
representing and demonizing scapegoats in popular culture and media
... undermining cherished sociality and morality," via a "'slippery
slope' of moral decay."'12 For instance, a moral panic over masturba-
tion in Britain in the nineteenth century involved a public narrative in
which "masturbation [led] to homosexuality or degeneracy for boys,
or ... loss of virginity, lesbianism, prostitution, or nymphomania for
girls.' 3 "[T]he slippery slope is not only a private fate, but also a
social disaster .... ,,14 Panics also often include "displacing responsi-
bility for security and well-being from the self and community to real
or imagined others on the margins of society.' 5
The vilification of lawyers identified by Galanter, as well as the
claim that litigation is leading to or caused by a degradation in norms
of "sturdy self-reliance" in favor of "contentious self-centeredness,"' 6
fit this trend well. For example, in his Harvard commencement
speech, Alexander Solzhenitsyn stated that "[w]henever the tissue of
8. Id. at 4-5.
9. Id. at 5.
10. See Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in
PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 267-75 (Carole S. Vance ed.,
1984).
11. See MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES & LEGAL CULTURE 181
(2005); cf. Florynce Kennedy, The Whorehouse Theory of Law, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE:
ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW ORDER AND THE COURTS 81, 81-82 (Robert Lefcourt ed., 1971).
12. Herdt, supra note 7, at 7-9.
13. Id. at 8.
14. Id. (quoting Alan Hunt, The Great Masturbation Panic and the Discourses of Moral Regu-
lation in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Britain, 8 J. HIST. SEX. 575, 598 (1998)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. at 9.
16. See Marc Galanter, Presidential Address, The Legal Malaise; Or, Justice Observed, 19 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 537, 540-42 (1985).
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life is woven of legalistic relationships, this creates an atmosphere of
spiritual mediocrity that paralyzes man's noblest impulses. ' 17 Ga-
lanter also identified a pattern of narratives in which litigation "damp-
ens enterprise, distracts managers, makes doctors practice defensive
medicine, increases costs of products, keeps useful products off the
market, and so on."1 8 Additionally, he articulated the most common
anti-lawyer themes, namely, "that lawyers are (1) corrupters of dis-
course; (2) fomenters of strife; (3) betrayers of trust; or (4) economic
predators."' 19
Importantly, the process of demonization in so-called sex panics is
often driven by and reflected in empirically false claims-sensational
and "hyperbolic media coverage that both reflects and produces sex
panics. '20 For instance, the risks of transmission of HIV among gay
persons and through casual contact were exaggerated, "promoting the
view of HIV/AIDS as just retribution . . . for the sexual depravity
produced by the sexual revolution in the 1960s and 1970s."'21
"[D]istortion, lies, or various forms of exaggeration" are used. 22 The
pattern often involves "the facts of the [salient] story [being] inflated,
suggesting that a moral code has been broken that threatens societal
progress and agreed-on norms... . [T]he framing and public under-
standing of a situation or phenomenon can change without the reality
of an event or change in trend. '23
The litigation panic described by Galanter similarly follows this
model. Galanter usefully demonstrated the falsity of claims about
numbers of lawyers, and the lack of nuance in claims about rising
amounts of litigation.24 Galanter also described the use of sensational
but relatively rare stories involving "bizarre claims, immense jury ver-
17. See Marc Galanter, supra note 1, at 27 (quoting SOLZHENITSYN AT HARVARD: THE AD-
DRESS, TWELVE EARLY RESPONSES AND Six LATER REFLECTIONS 7-8 (Ronald Berman ed.,
1980)).
18. Galanter, supra note 1, at 29.
19. Galanter, supra note 3.
20. Janice M. Irvine, Transient Feelings: Sex Panics and the Politics of Emotions, in MORAL
PANICS, SEX PANICS, supra note 7, at 234, 240.
21. Diane di Mauro & Carole Joffe, The Religious Right and the Reshaping of Sexual Policy:
Reproductive Rights and Sexuality Education During the Bush Years, in MORAL PANICS, SEX
PANICS, supra note 7, at 47, 71.
22. Saskia Eleonora Wieringa, Postcolonial Amnesia: Sexual Moral Panics, Memory, and Im-
perial Power, in MORAL PANICS, SEX PANICS, supra note 7, at 205, 209.
23. Cathy J. Cohen, Black Sexuality, Indigenous Moral Panics, and Respectability: From Bill
Cosby to the Down Low, in MORAL PANICS, SEX PANICS, supra note 7, at 104, 119.
24. Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81
TEX. L. REV. 285, 285, 299-303 (2002).
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dicts, undeserved windfalls, the engorgement of contingency fee law-
yers, the financial devastation of defendants, and other horrors."
25
The typical panic, however, represents a drive toward regulation.
"[T]he folk devils must .. be identified, incarcerated, exiled, or de-
stroyed. ' 26 As an alternative to destruction, they are often regulated
and controlled, as Michel Foucault famously described. The panics
"inflame policing and control," while also having the effect of causing
sexual practices to proliferate and spread, in a "Foucaultian para-
dox."' 27 In contrast, Galanter's litigation panic was driven, he argued,
by a reaction to the "heightening of public accountability in the
courts," which was an unwelcome "counter to deregulation in the ex-
ecutive branch of government. '28 Indeed, in 2002 he called all of this
"the turn against law," and suggested the libertarian impulse behind
the panic.29 Thus, the litigation panic is unique in that it is a panic that
seemed as though it would result in deregulation, rather than an in-
crease in regulation and control.
The litigation panic is an anti-law panic. It is libertarian in thrust, in
contrast to how we imagine typical panics, which are pro-regulation.
For instance, one of the classic panics-the Victorian panic over pros-
titution-was promoted in part by deeply progressive people, not only
by religious conservatives in Britain. 30 Some reformers even saw
prostitution as a necessary practice and gave up on trying to eradicate
it; instead, they sought only to contain it.31
III. THE CRISIS IN LEGAL EDUCATION AND REINSTANTIATION OF
THE LITIGATION PANIC
Despite the sharp contrast between the litigation panic as a liberta-
rian panic, and the classic moral and sex panics as impulses towards
regulation, we may be witnessing a new version of the anti-law and
lawyer theme, reinstantiated in strands of the discourse around the
cost of legal education outpacing the earning capacity of lawyers. If
this rhetoric represents a reinstantiation of the anti-lawyer theme, it
now better fits the classic model because it appears as a complicated
reformist impulse for regulation and control and sympathizes with the
25. Galanter, supra note 1, at 29.
26. Herdt, supra note 7, at 1, 12.
27. Id. at 13.
28. Galanter, supra note 1, at 30.
29. See Galanter, supra note 24, at 291-99.
30. See PAULA BARTLEY, PROSTITUTION: PREVENTION AND REFORM IN ENGLAND,
1860-1914, at 110-11 (June Purvis ed., 2000); see also JUDITH R. WALKOWITZ, PROSTITUTION
AND VICTORIAN SOCIETY: WOMEN, CLASS, AND THE STATE 6-7 (1980).
31. See JAMES GREENWOOD, THE SEVEN CURSES OF LONDON 271-74 (1869).
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lawyer in the same way that many reformists sympathized with prosti-
tutes during the Victorian era, even as they deemed the practice of
prostitution deeply immoral and degrading to society.
Although prostitution was deemed "the great social evil" during the
Victorian era, it was not always the prostitutes who were scapegoated
in the panic. Conservative evangelical reformers often "regarded
prostitutes as a source of pollution and a constant temptation to mid-
dle-class sons."' 32 In contrast, other reformers, including feminists,
scapegoated middle- and upper-class men, who, in their narrative, se-
duced young women and then abandoned them to a degraded life of
prostitution, sometimes after getting them pregnant. For instance,
James Greenwood, in The Seven Curses of London, claimed that
in countless cases ... these poor wretches did not in the original
"make their bed" .... If we could discover the truth, we might get
at the real bed-makers-the villainous conjurers of couches of roses
that were so speedily to turn to thorns and briars-in the seducer
and the base deserter. 33
Historian Judith Walkowitz describes how a critique of evangelical
writers "was shaped in response to popular indignation at the sexual
exploitation of working-class women by men of a superior class."' 34
Paula Bartley describes how the "seduction myth" was driven by the
need of "those involved in the rescue and reform of prostitutes" to
"convince themselves, and those whom they asked for financial sup-
port, that prostitutes were worth saving." She argues that despite the
existence of more "sophisticated" explanations, "there was a gradual,
and somewhat imperceptible, shift from holding prostitutes responsi-
ble for prostitution to thinking of them as the victims of masculine
sexual profligacy and social injustice."
The frequency of this narrative was deeply exaggerated, as
Walkowitz and Bartley have demonstrated. 35 Even at the time, "atti-
tudes were not always coherent-at one and the same time women
were viewed as victims, sinners and sexual contaminators, ' 36 but the
stereotype of the "fallen woman" was prevalent, despite the fact that
most prostitutes had their sexual initiation with working-class men
32. WALKOWITZ, supra note 30, at 32-34.
33. GREENWOOD, supra note 31, at 324-27.
34. See id. at 34-35; see also BARTLEY, supra note 30, at 4-5.
35. WALKOWITZ, supra note 30, at 18 ("The stereotyped sequence of girls seduced, pregnant,
and abandoned to the streets fitted only a small minority of women who ultimately moved into
prostitution."); BARTLEY, supra note 30, at 5 ("[Sluch beliefs were not borne out by the evidence
as most prostitutes were not seduced by men of the upper classes.... On the contrary, many had
been 'led astray' by other girls who had persuaded them to sell their bodies for money.").
36. BARTLEY, supra note 30, at 34.
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and most had working-class men as their clients. 37 Moreover, the rea-
sons for choosing to work as a prostitute were complex and multi-
factored, including a lack of good jobs for women in particular urban
locations. 38 Nevertheless, reformers who sympathized with the plight
of the prostitute still saw prostitution as a dangerous moral problem-
one to be controlled and limited.
The reformers' goal was to regulate, control, reform, and ultimately
integrate prostitutes into proper social life. 39 There were at least two
camps, the "repealers" and "extensionists." Repealers sought to re-
peal the gender-discriminatory Contagious Diseases Acts, which re-
quired prostitutes to register and submit to periodic internal
examinations to check for disease while letting their male clients go
unpunished. Extensionists sought to extend such regulations. Yet,
"both sides undoubtedly shared a similar rhetoric of reform and simi-
lar perspectives on class, the social order, and respectable social be-
havior.' '40 Indeed, one prominent extensionist "demonstrated a
greater intellectual curiosity and personal concern for the women's
welfare than other regulationists," while a prominent repealer, "de-
spite his feminist pretensions . . expressed his personal repugnance
for prostitutes."'41 "On both sides, enlightened social views coexisted
37. "Police returns available on the various ranks of prostitutes challenge the conventional
assumptions ... that the demand for prostitution largely emanated from middle-class men....
[T]he returns available indicate that a substantial majority of prostitutes catered to a working-
class clientele." WALKOWITZ, supra note 30, at 23. This was true even in "certain centers with a
substantial residential and transient middle class, like Edinburg and London." Id.
38. Id. ("For poor prostitutes, street-walking was a highly casual and seasonal occupation-
much like the alternative legitimate occupations open to the class of women who moved into
prostitution."). Walkowitz noted:
The relatively high concentration of prostitutes in ports and pleasure towns could have
reflected the uneven sex ratios, the limited employment opportunities open to women,
as well as the presence of a transient male population that formed a ready clientele for
the prostitutes. Likewise, the relatively lower concentration of prostitutes in textile and
hardware areas probably reflected the particular character of working-class social life
there: in those areas stable employment for men and (in the case of textile centers)
women may have permitted the continuation of traditional courting practices, so that
premarital sexuality with steady lovers culminated in marriage.
Id. at 22. Walkowitz also noted that differential rates of prostitution, in light of the "limited
geographic mobility of prostitutes," indicated that "women's move into prostitution was [largely]
a response to local conditions of the urban job market." Id.
39. See BARTLEY, supra note 30, at 25 ("Prostitution, it was believed, would be eliminated if
there were no prostitutes. Reformers therefore founded a variety of institutions ... to rehabili-
tate prostitutes and make them respectable once more .... Reform was entirely about working-
class women being saved by their middle-class 'superiors'.....
40. WALKOWITZ, supra note 30, at 83.
41. Id. at 82-84.
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with class prejudice and, in some cases, a fear of and hostility toward
female sexuality. '42
But when reform efforts such as the encouraged use of penitentia-
ries failed to eradicate prostitution, the social purity movement arose,
seeking to eliminate the cause of prostitution, which was deemed to
be immorality in men.43 Repressive moves to control homosexuality,
public houses, and the like were made, and greater powers were given
to the police to shut down brothels.44 While many elements of the
social purity movement placed thoroughgoing blame on men and
sought to regulate them, as opposed to prostitutes, the goal was still
the elimination of prostitution. In this way, the movement may not
have been anti-prostitute, but it was definitely anti-prostitution.
Today, the anti-lawyer theme has transformed into one that might
not appear anti-lawyer on its face, just as many feminist reformers of
the Victorian era were not anti-prostitute as a facial matter. They pit-
ied prostitutes, while simultaneously being anti-prostitution. Simi-
larly, today, the popular media tells a narrative that does not vilify
new law graduates, but pities them.45 In this narrative, many of them
have been seduced into the profession by those of a higher class (aca-
demics and administrators), then abandoned to live a degraded life
without any opportunity to repay the debt they have incurred.46
42. Id. at 85.
43. Bartley noted: "When it became evident that both the reform and other preventive move-
ments had failed to end prostitution, social purity workers tried to restrain prostitutes and to
create a moral climate in which prostitution would inevitably disappear .... Social purists,...
believed that men, not women, were responsible for prostitution ...." BARTLEY, supra note 30,
at 15-16.
44. Id. at 84 (describing how the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885 "gave the police
greater powers to prosecute streetwalkers and brothel-keepers" and "criminalised homosexual
acts between men," even as it raised the age of consent).
45. See, e.g., David Segal, Law School Economics, Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at 1
("[Blorrowing $150,000 or more is now a vastly riskier proposition given the scarcity of Big Law
jobs. Of course, that scarcity has not been priced into the cost of law school. How come? In
part, it is because schools have managed to convey the impression that those jobs aren't very
scarce.").
46. See id.
N.Y.L.S. is ranked in the bottom third of all law schools in the country, but with tuition
and fees now set at $47,800 a year, it charges more than Harvard. It increased the size
of the class that arrived in the fall of 2009 by an astounding 30[%], even as hiring in the
legal profession imploded. It reported in the most recent US News & World Report
rankings that the median starting salary of its graduates was the same as for those of
the best schools in the nation-even though most of its graduates, in fact, find work at
less than half that amount.
Id. In an article implying that the high cost of tuition is due to professors writing scholarship
(though it is not at all clear that this is the case), David Segal quoted Steven R. Smith, Dean of
California Western School of Law: "It is not obvious that students are the ones who should be
paying the cost of legal scholarship. They are generally borrowing the money to do this and they
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But while this narrative may not appear anti-lawyer in the way that
the litigation panic and lawyer jokes identified by Galanter were anti-
lawyer, some versions may indeed be a re-instantiation of an anti-
lawyering theme. The goal may be fewer lawyers, even though indi-
vidual lawyers are not blamed. 47 The narrative aims to reduce the
problem of "too many lawyers, not enough jobs," just as some of the
reformers of the Victorian era sought to reduce the profession of pros-
titution, even as they sympathized with the plight of individual
prostitutes.
This is not to say that many law graduates are not to be pitied, just
as it would be incorrect to say that prostitutes during the Victorian era
were leading a fulfilling life free from coercive pressures, danger, poor
health, and extreme financial hardship. But the fact that the current
narrative demonstrates sympathy for individual lawyers does not ne-
gate the dangerous impulse to eradicate or minimize the profession-
an impulse that ultimately diminishes access to justice.
The point of this analogy is not to mock those who are concerned
with the problem of the rising costs of law school by associating them
with prudes of the Victorian era. The point is to be wary of respond-
ing to law school debt-a real problem-with solutions that rely on
empirically unverified assumptions about why people take on that
debt. During the Victorian reform era, prostitutes did not lead happy
lives as a general matter, but the narrative that they were seduced into
prostitution by middle class men was based on flawed empirical evi-
dence and assumptions.
This obsession with seduction by middle-class men not only meant
the application of penitentiary-based reform solutions that were
doomed to fail, it also served as a distraction for middle-class reform-
ers from class and gender inequities that they could have been trying
to solve instead:
"[Alpart from a few Quakers who urged reformers to concentrate
on improving women's wages, and those who recommended women
join the Women's Protective and Provident League or a trade union
to campaign for better pay, few solutions were offered to end such
exploitation by those involved in the reform of prostitutes. 48
Lack of good work and opportunities for working-class women in
certain areas of England was a serious problem, and the solution
are the least able of all those in the profession to pay for it." David Segal, What They Don't
Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at 1.
47. Cf. Katherine Mangan, Law Schools Mull Whether They Are Churning Out Too Many
Lawyers, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 9, 2009, http://chronicle.com/article/Law-Schools-Ask-
Whether-They/47364.
48. BARTLEY, supra note 30, at 8 (citation omitted).
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could have been a reduction in the number of women who entered the
prostitution profession, or an increase in their power and options, per-
haps helping prostitution become a less coercive, more fulfilling, and
safer endeavor for many prostitutes. Instead, the reformers did not
have much success in eradicating prostitution through penitentiaries,
and the repressive elements of the social purity movement came to
fruition. The primary achievement of this movement was likely the
grant of police powers that harmed prostitutes.
IV. CONCLUSION: A PRO-LAW RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
IN LEGAL EDUCATION
We should be wary of making the same mistakes or giving too much
credence to those who do. Why do students actually choose to take
on law school debt? Is it really because they all have unrealistic vi-
sions of working in biglaw and raking in cash, and all we need to do to
save them from a miserable fate is to disclose the numbers to them
more clearly? First, disclosure statutes seem to have failed miserably
in the home mortgage arena, so why think they will work here? 49 And
second, what if failure to understand the choice one is making is not
the primary driver of the choice? What if the primary driver is that
students do not have other good options, just as working-class women
in sectors of England did not have other good options? 50 The choice
may be coerced, not by fraud, but rather by limited options. The cost
of undergraduate, graduate, and professional education has skyrock-
eted, not just the cost of law school. Many college graduates struggle
to get a good job to help them pay off their loans. And yet, how many
might we say would have been better off during the economic down-
turn, and in the long run, without a college degree?
Moreover, what if some prospective students knowingly and will-
ingly play what is essentially a lottery when they go to graduate and
professional school because they would rather buy the chance of a
better life for their children, even if it is likely to come at the cost of
49. Cf. Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now-Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U. BALT. L.
REv. 1, 35, 47-53 (2011) (explaining why even when disclosure statutes that pre-dated the finan-
cial crisis of 2008 were complied with, it was unlikely that rational decisions would result).
50. Another possibility is that rising tuition is simply a reflection of market competition: Com-
petition amongst law schools for the "best" students induces them not to charge lower prices, a
strategy that fails, but rather to attract students by offering more and better services, which cost
money. See Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and Competition in Legal Education: A
Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal Profession and Legal Education, 24
STAN. L. & POL. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (citing Caroline Hoxby's work and concluding that
this type of process drives rising undergraduate tuition, and raising the possibility that a parallel
process explains rising law school tuition).
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crushing debt, than to have no chance at all? What if law school is
viewed as a risk worth taking on behalf of one's children? Is banning
the sale of the lottery ticket or voluntarily going out of the ticket sale
business all we can do in this situation? Instead, what if we tried to
provide options that are better than a lottery ticket? The latter is
much harder than the former, but it is the more socially responsible
course of action.
If limited alternatives for a chance at a fulfilling life are what allow
law schools to charge ever more shocking tuition amounts, then the
response is not to try to convince students not to come to law school-
that will not work because it does nothing to alter the limited supply
of attractive alternatives. The students will continue to come. Nor is
the response to force students not to attend law school by shutting
down schools or reducing loan eligibility. That would simply relegate
them to some other career or school choice that is no better. This is
not to say that disclosure is a bad thing, but an obsession with law
schools as seducers may turn out to be a massive distraction, if not an
empirically inaccurate description of why people want to go to law
school.
In addition, if, unlike the Victorian social purity movement and
other reformers, we do not think that lawyering and law is actually
"the great social evil," then why not find ways to make the profession
actually work to fulfill socially valuable roles and find ways to reduce
the cost of the education so that more people can fill those roles?
Reactions to law school debt that propose reducing the number of law
schools, either directly or indirectly, seek to contain the legal profes-
sion, and ultimately law, in contrast to proposals to reduce the cost of
legal education so that more graduates can actually afford to perform
the work of lawyering. The latter strand of the discourse values law
and believes that lawyers are potential agents for distributing access to
its benefits, while the former strand devalues law and the work of law-
yers unless it is meeting a market demand driven by wealthy
organizations.
The proposal that law schools that do not produce lawyers who can
pay back massive levels of debt through their legal employment
should shut down would mean that law will fail, even more than it
already does, to serve those who cannot pay, or can only pay a little.
Galanter pointed out that the litigation panic and anti-lawyering
themes of the 1980s left out the problem of access to justice for those
who are not elite. Similarly, panic over law school debt leaves out this
problem, as long as the response is to simply match the supply of law-
yers exclusively to the needs of wealthy clients.
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For those who care about access to justice, real reforms to the deliv-
ery of legal services, including a wide imagination about what legal
services are, is in order. This could mean innovations in providing
traditional legal education but at a lower cost, innovations in legal ed-
ucation that prepare students for different kinds of work, American
Bar Association accreditation reform that would permit more innova-
tion, a call for licensing authorities to narrow the definition of what
constitutes unauthorized practice of law, and the reformation of li-
censing exams to open access to the profession while better predicting
the ability to perform the multitude of tasks real lawyers can do.
Legal education is facing a crisis, and there is a moral imperative to
do something about it. But nobody who truly cares about opportunity
for the working class or the poor should be satisfied with minimally
improved disclosure and the closing down of all but a few elite law
schools.
